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Top Agro (TA - not its real name) is a small crop protection start-up operating in the European 
Union.  In a relatively short period of time TA has been able to secure a reasonable profit margin 
and build a solid niche in the Italian crop protection market.  The driving force in their success is 
the professional expertise of the two owners, their knowledge of the domestic market, and the 
highly flexible business model they’ve developed.  Chemicals are sourced either in the Far East 
via a Hong Kong based commercial partner or purchased directly from other European domestic 
suppliers.  TA is responsible for the formulation and packaging of the finished product, which is 
then distributed in the domestic Italian market.   Although TA is now profitable, further sales 
growth is unlikely.  One of the owners is convinced that significant benefits may be obtained by 
identifying and controlling the key risks that TA is exposed to, in particular by reducing the price 
risk in their international supply chain.   
 
This case has been classroom tested at the senior undergraduate and MBA level with good 
results.  It works well as opening case for an eMBA course on managing price risk, as it provides 
an opportunity to map the risk “opportunity set” via the ERM challenging students to reason and 
set intervention priorities by focusing on currency exchange rates and risk management as the 
most immediate and promising action. 
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After working countless hours preparing for a crucial business trip to Hong Kong, George was 
exhausted and needed a break. The dreary November afternoon in Milan deterred him from 
taking his normal brisk walk through a nearby park.  He settled into his chair and scrolled the 
financial news headlines on his laptop. George, the president of Top Agro, used this opportunity 
to relax and stay abreast of current global events. He felt he needed to do this in order to advance 
his company’s long-term sustainability. 
 
A story on a major news feed soon captured his attention. “Globalization Concerns of a 
Successful Start-up” was about a high tech company which had managed to grow exponentially 
thanks to excellent technical know-how and profound knowledge of the domestic market. 
Despite early growth, the piece explained, the company was now held back by difficulties in 
gaining access to convenient and reasonably priced international financial services, something 
that was essential to reducing costs and supporting its future expansion.   
 
Join the crowd…thought George.  After all, the story seemed similar to his own company’s story 
and to a large extent the reason for his forthcoming business trip to Asia. 
 
* * * * 
 
George’s company, Top Agro (TA), is a successful crop protection firm that he started with a 
colleague in 2000.  They left a large and somewhat lethargic corporation to venture into business 
for themselves.  Top Agro is a highly specialized company based in Milan, in the region of 
Lombardy, serving the entire Italian market.  The company began breaking even by 2003, and 
six years later, enjoyed a profit margin George considered “reasonable” for a sector increasingly 
dominated by large multinationals.  Top Agro weathered the 2008-2009 global crisis reasonably 
well; sales of some product lines shrunk by about 5%, and the age of receivables had increased 
noticeably, but “hard” losses remained below 1% of total sales.    
 
George had reason to be proud of Top Argo’s achievements. On the eve of its 10th birthday, the 
company had managed to grow the product line and expand into the micronutrient fertilizer 
market while developing, rationalizing and consolidating its network of international supply 
chain partners.  TA’s main focus was the Italian market, where the company built a profitable 
niche for its own brand of specialty crop chemicals.  They were also sold as “no name” and 
“private label” products.   TA had been quite successful in exploiting its production and 
administrative flexibility with relatively low fixed costs and had specialized in the production of 
higher margin products with a relatively limited market potential, too small to attract the interest 
of large multinationals. 
 
The first 10 years had been a growth story.  Now, as market shares stagnated in many segments, 
George realized it’s been a struggle to maintain volumes and margins under increasing pressure.  
The two principals struggled to reinvent their push strategy and refine the efficiency of existing 
operations in order to increase profitability.  They knew their company had grown thanks to their 
ability to merge entrepreneurialism with scientific knowledge and during the ``early years. They 
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serendipity to solve most problems, as they arose. It was clear that TA had already captured the 
lower hanging fruits available in the domestic market and volume growth was almost impossible. 
But, additional profits could be had by promoting a more efficient management of their supply 
chain and significant gains could be achieved through implementing better risk and cost controls 
throughout their supply chain.  
 
Their chartered accountant had been asking for a sober, comprehensive assessment of all risks, 
something TA had never done during the forgiving and fast growth years.  Perhaps, George felt, 
we should listen to her more carefully. 
 
Concerns were not difficult to spot, from the tightening regulatory scenario which required 
increasingly expensive registration and certification protocols, to the crowding out of several 
independent suppliers of chemical inputs, to the worsening demographics of Top Agro’s 
independent retail sales force, which was shrinking at an increasing pace as salespeople reached 
retirement age.   
 
A lot needed to be done to streamline TA`s international supply chain.  During their first 10 
years, Top Agro concentrated on the growth of domestic sales, happy to simplify and standardize 
their international supply chain which was now handled via a trusted Hong Kong partner who 
was responsible for sourcing chemicals primarily in China and arranging for their shipment to 
Milan.  One of the reasons TA did not pay too much attention to their supply chain was because 
their Hong Kong partner had been extending extremely long terms on TA’s USD payables.  This 
was a flexible and convenient arrangement for Top Agro, resulting from several years of close 
collaboration and mutual trust.
1  
 
The international financial crisis of 2008-09, and the violent increase in exchange rate volatility  
convinced George it was necessary to invest time and effort into improving the efficiency of 
TA’s supply chain, and develop convenient and cost effective access to modern and 
competitively priced financial services.  The steep appreciation of the US dollar during the 
second part of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 could have had disastrous consequences for Top 
Agro, as the company had neither a formal exchange rate forecasting nor hedging policies in 
place.  Quite simply TA had been basing its budget decisions on limited qualitative information 
provided by senior staff at local branches of regional banks.  The 20% drop of the Euro relative 
to the US dollar during the middle of 2008 had caught Top Agro completely without any 
protection.  This change alone could have cut TA’s EBITDA in half.  With a virtual gun to their 
head, the two partners decided to postpone all US dollar payments, gambling on their partner’s 
patience and wait for a stronger Euro.  They were fully aware of the limited sustainability of this 
approach.  
  
By the end of 2009 the Euro had regained some strength and was back to a comfortable $1.40-
1.50 range which allowed the company to lock a comfortable average margin for the crop year.  
Top Agro had been fortunate, once more, but George now understood that a “do nothing” 
approach was indeed a highly speculative strategy which exposed the company to almost 
unbearable risks.   
 
                                                           
1 The Hong Kong partner had recently purchased a 32% equity interest in Top Agro.   Braga / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 1, 2011 
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TA’s accountant also considered the possible expansion into foreign markets.  This was been 
tabled due to its complexity and high capital requirements. The two partners felt they could not 
transfer any competitive advantage from their core competencies.  Additionally, the European 
crop protection market was much more concentrated than the Italian one, with much higher 
barriers to entry.  
 
George was convinced that improving efficiency of TA’s supply chain and reducing its costs was 
probably the first strategic priority at this time. 
 
The Business: Top Agro’s Global Supply Chain 
 
Top Argo’s global supply chain was reasonably simple and designed to provide the company low 
cost inputs from the Far East.  Most chemicals were purchased in China, in USD, and shipped to 
the corporate warehouse in Northern Italy.    
 
Until recently TA’s Hong Kong partner satisfied over 95% of chemical input needs.  This 
percentage had recently dropped to approximately 30%, primarily due to the new certification 
requirements set by the European Union that had shrunk the number of certified producers that 
could be reached by the partner.  In the last fiscal year, the remaining 70% of inputs had been 
supplied by other international producers, and procured directly by Top Agro.  These purchases 
in the Far East were crucial to securing Top Agro’s long-term profitability. On average, the EU 
domestic prices for chemicals were 100% to 150% higher than what Top Agro was paying 
internationally.  Obviously, within the EU, procurement strategies were much simpler for Top 
Agro, but because of costs, the company could afford them only for a limited share of their 
overall procurement needs.  In the last fiscal year, approximately 70% to 80% of chemical inputs 
were priced in USD, with the remaining 20-30% in Euros.  The Hong Kong partner was still 
allowing the longest payment terms and matching the age of Top Agro’s receivables.  Payables 
with other suppliers were shorter, averaging 200 days. 
 
In order to comply with increasingly complex health and safety regulations, Top Agro relied on 
specialized third parties for the further processing of chemicals and final packaging.  Distribution 
to regional wholesalers and direct delivery to a few large retail accounts was completed directly 
by Top Agro from their centralized warehouse.  
 
Top Agro’s products were highly crop-specific, destined mostly for fruit and horticultural crops 
in Southern Italy.  The business was primarily seasonal, driven by farmers purchasing decisions 
at a specific time of year.   
 
Inputs were purchased once per crop year, in late winter through early spring before the start of 
the planting season.  Shipments to Milan were a rather routine activity completed through large 
commercial shipping companies and most of the time an uneventful commodity process.  
Chemicals were normally received 3 to 6 months after submitting the purchase order.  Suppliers 
were paid an initial deposit of 15% when placing the order; another 15% when the commodity 
was received; and the remaining 70% of the invoice was settled in the following Fall or Winter 
for the supplies received from the Hong Kong partner—or 180-210 days for other suppliers.  It 
was not unusual to have two-year payables outstanding with the Hong Kong partner.   
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Matching TA’s payables with their receivables was a lengthy process.  Normally TA received 
payment in Euros at the end of the crop year and then proceeded to complete payments in USD 
to foreign suppliers for inputs ordered about 18 months earlier. The Hong Kong partner had more 
than once demonstrated flexibility and significant patience on this matter and George counted on 
their availability to extend as needed with the age of Top Agro’s payables.   George knew it was 
these flexible terms and progressively longer payables that had financed the growing company’s 
larger cash requirements.  As a small start-up, it was practically impossible to find a bank 
financing in the domestic market with the flexible payment terms offered by the Hong Kong 
based trading company. They provided a practical and effective one stop shopping service, a true 
life line for the start up.  As the company grew financially more established George was 
increasingly aware of the possible cost of this “flexible trade financing” arrangement.   
 
Although there were large companies in Northern Europe that could provide a far shorter supply 
chain and significantly simplify both the procurement and regulatory compliance requirements, 
George was equally aware of their higher prices and rigid payment terms. It was therefore crucial 
for TA to be able to continue this strategy of international direct purchase.  EU domestic prices 
for chemical inputs were 100 to 200% higher than what Top Agro was paying in the international 
markets.  Recently George had a chance to confirm this when the last shipment of a specific 
chemical originating from a certified producer in China was paid eight USD/kg compared with 
29 USD/Kg charged by a large EU multinational.  Sure, an EU based procurement strategy 
would be simpler for Top Agro, but it was also not affordable.   
 
From a strategic perspective, the key competitive decision for Top Agro was the publication and 
distribution of its “Crop Year Catalogue”.  The catalogue and price list were released late in the 
fall or early winter.  The extreme currency volatility that followed with the 2008 sub-prime 
crisis, forced Top Agro to reset its prices, and this was not well received by clients who were 
used to considering prices quoted in the catalogue only once for an entire crop year.   
 
Top Agro received most purchase orders for their crop-specific products in late winter to early 
summer following the publication of the current catalogue.  These orders were received about 12 
months after placing orders for the inputs. Chemical products were delivered to clients 3 to 6 
months after the orders, and payments were received from Top Agro after the harvest of the 
specific crop, often in the fall through winter of the following year–a full 18 to 24 months after 
placing the order for the chemicals.  The average age of receivables for a specific crop year was 
about 7 to 10 months later in the fall and at the beginning of the second winter, only to drop to 
almost zero shortly thereafter.  
 
Approximately 60% of sales were generated by small independent distributors, large distributors 
accounted for 20% of sales; direct sales to large clients accounted for the remaining 20%.    
Exhibit 1 illustrates the complete timeline of the FY2010 supply chain, for chemicals procured 




George was proud of Top Agro, yet fully aware of the relative fragility of his company.   
Sales in the most recent fiscal year (FY2009) had for the first time topped 10 million Euros. The 
cost of imported chemicals was the single largest cost item, at 4.8 million Euros, followed by Braga / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 1, 2011 
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processing and distribution at 2 million Euros; operating expenses at 0.8 million Euros; and HR 
at 0.7 Million Euros.  Interest paid in FY 2009 was 0.5 million Euros; depreciation was 0.3 
million Euros and corporate taxes were 0.36 million Euros.  Net income was 0.54 million Euros.  
A small dividend of 0.04 million Euros was declared, with 0.5 million Euros in retained 
earnings.
2    
 
Exhibit 1. Global supply chain timeline: Crop Year 2009-2010, Hong Kong partner. 
Spring–Summer 2008 (Start of supply chain timeline, month =0):  
Raw chemical purchased in USD from Far East suppliers, for delivery 3-6 mo later.  
Payment: 15% at order, 15% upon receipt at warehouse, 70% expected in fall 2009 – winter 
2010. Prices set at time of order, in USD. 
 
Late Summer–Early Fall 2008 (month=3-6): 
Raw chemical received.  Second payment of 15%.   
Top Agro starts further processing and packaging.   
 
Fall 2008–Winter 2009 (month=6-9): 
Catalogue produced, & price list defined.  Both are widely distributed. 
 
Early Spring–Summer 2009 (month=9-12): 
Orders received;  
Initial shipments of crop – specific products to wholesalers; terms to the end of the specific 
crop year, late in fall of 2009, early winter 2010.  
Process start ex novo in late winter – early spring of 2009 for the crop year 2010-2011. 
 
Fall 2009 –Winter 2010 (month=15-18):  
As age of oldest receivables grows to 6 to 9 months, the first payments are received:  Retail 
clients pay retailers, who pay wholesalers, who pay Top Agro.  Payments are received in €; 
further delays of up to 3 months are not unusual. 
Top Argo’s outstanding payables are 15-18 months old for 2008 orders and 3 – 6 months old 
for 2009 orders.  Average age of payables hits 13-17 months (30% of invoice paid when 
chemicals received). 
 
Fall 2009 –Winter 2010 (month=15-18 +): 
Company completes payment of USD invoices for the summer – fall 2008 shipments.  




Top Agro’s Balance Sheet was equally simple.  The 12.15 million Euros in assets included 0.5 
million Euros in cash and in short term bank’ deposits, and 8.64 million Euros in receivables.  
Long term assets included 1 million Euros in land and buildings, before cumulative depreciation 
of 0.1 million Euros, and 2.5 million Euros in equipment, before cumulative depreciation of 0.35 
million Euros.   Total liabilities were 8.35 million Euros.  Short term liabilities listed 5.75 million 
Euros of payables (mostly USD denominated) and 0.1 million Euros of current portion of long 
term debt.  Long term debt amounted to 2.5 million Euros.  Shareholders equity included 0.5 
million Euros in capital stock and 3.3 million of retained earnings.    
 
Top Agro’ statement of cash flow for FY 2009 reflected the ongoing challenges of financing a 
business expansion, the importance of trade financing, and the attempt by management to 
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consolidate at least part of Top Agro’s corporate financial needs in long term debt.  Operations 
had required 0.044 million Euros; Long term bank financing had provided 0.35 million Euros; 
Investments had required 0.25 million Euros.  Cash did increase from 0.44 to 0.5 million Euros. 
At the end of the 2010 fiscal year, Top Agro had available an additional 1 million Euros in a 
short-term line of credit from local banks. Top Agro’s FY 2009 Income Statement; Balance 
Sheet; and Statement of Cash Flow are presented in Exhibits 2, 3 and 4.   
 
Exhibit 2. Top Agro: Income Statement,  FY ending Dec. 31, 2009 (1000€) 
Sales 10000 
  Cost of chemicals  4800 
Operating margin  5200 
Processing and distribution   2000 
Op expenses  800 
HR costs  700 
EBITA 1700 
  Depreciation  300 
  Interest   500 
  Taxes at 40%  360 
Income 540 
Dividend paid  40 
Note: Based on actual data, modified to protect confidentiality 
 
 
Exhibit 3. Top Agro: Balance Sheet,  FY ending Dec. 31, 2009 (1000 €) 
Assets  
Cash and short term deposits  500 
Accounts receivables  8600 
Short term assets  9100 
Equipment (book)  2500 
Cumulative depreciation  350 
Building (book)  1000 
Cumulative depreciation  100 
Long term assets  3050 
Total assets  12150 
Liabilities 
 
Accounts payables   5750 
Current portion, long term debt  100 
Short term liabilities  5850 
Long term debt  2500 
Long term liabilities  2500 
Capital stock  500 
Retained earnings  3300 
Shareholders equity  3800 
Total liabilities and shareholders equity  12150 
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Exhibit 4. Top Agro: Statement of Cash Flow, FY ending Dec. 31, 2009(1000€) 
Income & depreciation  840 
Change in inventory  -1000 
Change in receivables  -1700 
Change in payables  1816 
Cash flow, operations  -44 
Equipment purchases  -250 
Cash flow, investing  -250 
Long term bank financing  -250 
Cash flow, financing  -250 
Initial cash  444 
Final cash  500 
Change in cash  56 





The company’s early success resulted from the professionalism and dedication of the two senior 
partners, each with an advanced research degree in Crop Protection and a sound understanding of 
the Italian marketplace. From the beginning finances and accounting had been the responsibility 
of a formally trained accountant who was also the spouse of one of the partners.  Two clerical 
secretaries and four warehouse workers completed the lean team of Top Agro. 
 
Further processing and the packaging of the chemicals were contracted.  This choice was 
essential in order to remain flexible and cost competitive, given the complexity of the 
environmental and safety regulations and the relative small scale of product batches.  Third party 
distributors were also used.  The two partners managed all finances, HR, registrations and 
certification requirements, purchases of raw chemicals, and coordinated wholesale and retail 
marketing and sales through a network of non exclusive regional salespersons.  
 





The two principals agreed that further sales growth in the domestic market was almost 
impossible, given the increasing restrictions placed by EU’s health and environmental 
regulations on most chemical compounds used by the company. Compliance with increasingly 
complex regulatory requirements was extremely expensive and time consuming; for example, 
certification of a single product could easily require in excess of 250,000 Euros and several 
months of testing and true patience.  At the same time, the cost of a viable R&D pipeline was 
simply unaffordable for TA.  This cost was the key driver of industry consolidation, and Braga / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 1, 2011 
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restricted access to the latest generation of chemicals.
3   The effective distribution of finished 
products was an increasing challenge, as distribution opportunities were shrinking given the 
retirements of many independent agents and small retailers.
4    
 
Long discussions had convinced the partners of the need to improve the efficiency and the 
financial performance of Top Argo’s current global supply chain.   Credit risk in the domestic 
market was expected to increase.  Given the limited dimension of clients, Top Agro could not 
rely on information from conventional providers, and credit insurance was too expensive and 
rigid to be a viable alternative for Top Agro, so that the modeling and the management of this 
risk was largely a matter of experience and common sense more than a rational process.  Very 
little could be done to recover credits in a timely fashion via legal action and the principals 
agreed that prevention and flexible negotiation were the only practical tools Top Agro had 
available. 
 
Both principals felt that additional efficiencies and opportunities could be found by improving 
control of input costs, which largely meant improving the handling of currency and interest rate 
risks.  Top Agro appreciated the flexible trade financing terms offered by their offshore partners 
and were satisfied this would continue in the future, but they also knew this patience and 
flexibility carried its implicit price.  The financial results at Top Agro had improved their own 
credit rating and their direct access to a sufficient credit line.  George observed the recent 
exchange rate fluctuations had benefited Top Agro.  On the other hand, the memory of the cost 
of a strong dollar following the 2008 sub-prime crisis was instrumental in convincing them that 
currency risk would remain high and was a key challenge for TA.  In fact, a large chart posted in 
George’s office illustrated a 15 years history of the Euro-US dollar exchange rate and this chart 
was updated regularly.  A copy of this chart is presented as Exhibit 5.    
 
 
* * * * 
 
George suddenly realized that the news story he was reading had prompted him to review several 
key issues for Top Agro.  It was time to return to work and finalize the documents he needed for 
the meeting with the Far East partner.  His plan was to discuss how to complete an enterprise risk 
management assessment for Top Agro, and identify a number of priorities that could be 
effectively addressed.  This could improve Top Agro`s credit rating and profitability.  George 
felt this was a safe and strategic way to initiate a comprehensive discussion about the currency 
exposures within Top Agro`s supply chain.  It offered ways to reduce them, without the risk of 
upsetting their patient and trusted supply chain and equity partner.   
 
As George went back to work on his documents, these key deliverables became increasingly 
clear: prepare a reasoned map of the many risks faced by Top Agro; identify criteria that should 
be used to quantify these risks; and, identify the potential tools and strategies that TA could use 
to control them.   
 
                                                           
3 George estimated that the cost of a complete EU regulatory dossier for a single chemical input could exceed 2 
million Euros.  This was simply unaffordable for Top Agro. 
4 George estimated that the number of independent retail outlets had decreased 25% over the last 24 months. Braga / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 1, 2011 
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This would be complemented by a reasoned list of risk management priorities for Top Agro after 
having considered each exposure, the cost, and the expected effectiveness of the appropriate risk 
control measures that could be implemented by Top Agro.  
   
Based on the due diligence already completed, George decided that a key request to be tabled at 
the meeting was the development of a transparent, efficient protocol to control exchange rate risk 
at Top Agro.  In order to do so, George was determined to develop a detailed model of Top 
Argo’s exposure to currency risk, detailing its timeline, the amount and type (long/short) of the 
exposure, and develop a currency risk management protocol for Top Agro, including the 
necessary policy and procedures for its safe implementation.  
 
To this end, George gathered weekly and monthly spot exchange rate data.  The monthly data are 
presented in Exhibit 6, with descriptive statistics for weekly percentage changes presented in 
Exhibit 7, and calculated the actual impact on EBITDA of the observed exchange rate 
fluctuations for the last 10 crop years, almost 30% in absolute value, in Exhibit 8. To illustrate 
the need to invest in order to improve TA’s forecasting ability, George calculated the possible 
range of EBITDA obtained if the exchange rate had been set by perfect foresight at the best 
possible observed value or by complete managerial failure at the worst possible value for each 
crop year from 1999 to 2008; and the annual range, presented in Exhibit 9, averaged 41%.  
George felt confident that the meeting would be long but fruitful.  Sure this was a lot to plan for 
in a single meeting, but it seemed absolutely necessary in order to protect the long-term 





Exhibit 5. €/USD Spot Exchange Rate, Friday Close, Jan. 
 
 
               















































































































































































































































































































































































































Exhibit 6.  Monthly Euro/USD Cash Exchange Rate Jan. 1999 – Dec. 2009
Month Open High Low Close Month Open High Low Close
Jan‐98 108820 111620 106090 106840 Jan‐04 125470 128980 123720 124600
Feb‐98 106890 109600 106450 107700 Feb‐04 124630 128630 124000 124850
Mar‐98 107690 108590 105500 105860 Mar‐04 124800 125030 120830 123020
Apr‐98 105870 109760 105370 108920 Apr‐04 123700 123700 118020 119760
May‐98 108930 111510 108910 109500 May‐04 119550 122740 117890 122060
Jun‐98 109500 110980 107640 108180 Jun‐04 122320 123300 120000 121810
Jul‐98 108170 110860 106730 110090 Jul‐04 121680 124540 120090 120180
Aug‐98 109790 112210 107870 111630 Aug‐04 120600 123710 119800 121790
Sep‐98 111630 117730 111010 117240 Sep‐04 121710 124310 120370 124310
Oct‐98 117190 123200 116950 118250 Oct‐04 124020 128120 122340 127870
Nov‐98 118250 118840 114090 115500 Nov‐04 127510 133130 126640 132850
Dec‐98 115500 119090 115500 117170 Dec‐04 132920 136500 131880 135430
Jan‐99 117400 118900 113430 113570 Jan‐05 135100 135100 129400 130290
Feb‐99 113710 113950 109340 110260 Feb‐05 130320 132690 127420 132410
Mar‐99 110240 110650 106850 107660 Mar‐05 132190 134680 128660 129620
Apr‐99 107730 108810 105500 105800 Apr‐05 129610 131120 127910 128600
May‐99 105900 108270 104030 104130 May‐05 128580 129670 123000 123020
Jun‐99 104230 105570 102660 103380 Jun‐05 122480 123280 120230 121010
Jul‐99 103420 107430 101120 106970 Jul‐05 120840 122440 118790 121260
Aug‐99 107000 108250 104100 105730 Aug‐05 122160 124580 121430 123340
Sep‐99 105730 107270 102900 106950 Sep‐05 123810 125510 119930 120120
Oct‐99 106890 109090 104370 105410 Oct‐05 119290 121840 119070 119920
Nov‐99 105460 105910 100400 100890 Nov‐05 120160 120680 116480 117900
Dec‐99 100890 102930 99920 100880 Dec‐05 117530 120410 116630 118330
Jan‐00 100850 104130 96750 96880 Jan‐06 118800 123050 118700 121470
Feb‐00 96960 100850 94060 96450 Feb‐06 121030 121050 118440 119220
Mar‐00 96400 97900 94810 95540 Mar‐06 119390 121970 118710 121220
Apr‐00 95600 97510 90340 91130 Apr‐06 120640 126270 120620 126110
May‐00 91060 94100 88470 93730 May‐06 126270 129210 125960 128440
Jun‐00 93750 96960 92850 95250 Jun‐06 127390 129610 124940 127850
Jul‐00 95200 95950 91960 92600 Jul‐06 127990 128270 124680 127700
Aug‐00 92600 92890 88430 88770 Aug‐06 127640 129090 127140 128140
Sep‐00 88780 90370 84430 88310 Sep‐06 128140 128370 126420 126840
Oct‐00 88370 88560 82300 84850 Oct‐06 126960 127720 124910 127650
Nov‐00 84860 87930 83750 87260 Nov‐06 127530 132600 126850 132470
Dec‐00 87270 94250 87050 94220 Dec‐06 132470 133400 130670 131970
Jan‐01 94260 95920 91170 93680 Jan‐07 132750 132900 128870 130260
Feb‐01 93650 94440 90200 92320 Feb‐07 130170 132450 129230 132310
Mar‐01 92380 93800 87590 87590 Mar‐07 132230 133820 130840 133530
Apr‐01 87720 90870 87040 88680 Apr‐07 133650 136690 133290 136500
May‐01 88680 90050 84420 84580 May‐07 136470 136610 134170 134530
Jun‐01 84530 86690 84140 84930 Jun‐07 134360 135380 132770 135310
Jul‐01 84910 88210 83520 87560 Jul‐07 135900 138360 135870 136890
Aug‐01 87550 92370 87400 91250 Aug‐07 136560 138190 133980 136240
Sep‐01 91020 93300 88270 91120 Sep‐07 135850 142690 135540 142690
Oct‐01 91000 92440 88650 89980 Oct‐07 142180 145020 140290 145020
Nov‐01 90050 91200 87370 89580 Nov‐07 144240 148820 144200 146360
Dec‐01 89570 90810 87430 89120 Dec‐07 146590 147620 143230 146000
Jan‐02 88980 90630 85740 85800 Jan‐08 146890 149070 145000 148750
Feb‐02 85880 87990 85650 86870 Feb‐08 148850 152210 144570 151900
Mar‐02 86950 88690 86330 87180 Mar‐08 151980 158440 151830 157810
Apr‐02 87170 90440 87130 90050 Apr‐08 156750 160080 155300 156370
May‐02 90030 94160 89890 93260 May‐08 155180 157900 153690 155550
Jun‐02 93270 99880 93040 99130 Jun‐08 155160 157910 153180 157490
Jul‐02 99140 102120 97160 97820 Jul‐08 157800 159960 155390 155920
Aug‐02 97750 99320 96240 98260 Aug‐08 155740 156070 145840 146660
Sep‐02 98180 100060 96100 98750 Sep‐08 145130 148020 139020 140790
Oct‐02 98670 99260 96880 99060 Oct‐08 140740 140760 124220 127560
Nov‐02 99050 101710 98810 99430 Nov‐08 128250 130560 124510 127050
Dec‐02 99460 105050 98630 104930 Dec‐08 126330 146450 125930 139500
Jan‐03 104900 109050 103360 107730 Jan‐09 138650 139440 127870 127900
Feb‐03 107810 109350 106670 108040 Feb‐09 127670 130680 125290 126960
Mar‐03 107780 110830 105040 109310 Mar‐09 125850 137270 124940 132800
Apr‐03 109120 111870 105620 111830 Apr‐09 132530 135020 129190 132620
May‐03 111800 119330 111580 117750 May‐09 132790 141500 132390 141320
Jun‐03 117160 119300 114000 115140 Jun‐09 141960 143190 137710 140370
Jul‐03 115160 116110 111160 112380 Jul‐09 141290 143040 138430 142570
Aug‐03 112310 114260 107940 109780 Aug‐09 142560 144470 140460 143340
Sep‐03 109930 117390 107640 116610 Sep‐09 143320 148440 141780 146380
Oct‐03 116580 118600 115350 115950 Oct‐09 146420 150620 144810 147180
Nov‐03 115810 120190 113770 119850 Nov‐09 147200 151440 146270 150057
Dec‐03 119730 126490 119380 125880 Dec‐09 150050 151410 142180 143260  
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Exhibit 7.  Summary Data: Weekly Euro/USD  

































1999 108180  117240  96880  -17%  58%  -50% 
2000 103380  106950  93680  -12%  55%  -34% 
2001 95250  88310  85800  -3%  49%  -7% 
2002 84930  91120  107730  18%  41%  37% 
2003 99130  98750  124600  26%  38%  50% 
2004 115140  116610  130290  12%  43%  25% 
2005 121810  124310  121470  -2%  49%  -6% 
2006 121010  120120  130260  8%  44%  19% 
2007 127850  126840  148750  17%  41%  35% 
2008 135310  142690  127900  -10%  54%  -28% 
Average 47%  4% 
Stdev 7%  34% 
(*) Initial input cost -before currency fluctuation- is set to equal 48% of finished good price. 
(**) Initial EBITDA -before the impact of currency fluctuation- is set at 20% of finished good price. 
 
 
Exhibit 9. Range of possible impact of best and worst timing in the pricing of Exchange Rate on 
a 20% EBITDA, 1999 - 2009. 
Crop 
Year 
Best observed ER 
change, %  
Worst observed ER 
change, %  
Impact of best-worst ER on 
20% EBITDA (*) (**) 
1999 9%  -10%  48% 
2000 3%  -18%  60% 
2001 -1%  -11%  28% 
2002 27%  1%  48% 
2003 27%  0%  52% 
2004 18%  4%  27% 
2005 11%  -3%  32% 
2006 9%  -3%  27% 
2007 16%  -1%  36% 
2008 17%  -6%  50% 
(*) Initial input cost -before currency fluctuation- is set to equal 48% of finished good price. 
(**) Initial EBITDA -before the impact of currency fluctuation- is set at 20% of finished good price. 
   ER       1-wk  % change 
Min 0.8383  -6.13% 
Max 1.5891  5.33% 
Stdev 0.1983  1.4333% 
Average 1.1772  0.05% 